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DELIA COCULESCU AND JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET
Abstract. The aim of this paper is to put forward a new family of risk measures that -as
the coherent/convex risk measures- impose a preference order on random cash flows and can
be interpreted as prices. But at the difference of the axiomatic approach of Artzner, Delbaen,
Eber and Heath (1999) and the subsequent extensions of this model, our risk measures are
associated with the optimal policies of shareholder value maximizing company. We study
these optimal policies and the related risk measures that we call shareholder risk measures.
We emphasize the fact that due to the specific corporate environment, in particular the
limited shareholders’ liability and the possibility to pay out dividends from the cash reserves,
these risk measures are not convex. Also, they depend on the specific economic situation
of the firm, in particular its current cash level, and thus they are not translation invariant.
This paper bridges the gap between two important branches of mathematical finance: risk
measures and optimal dividends.
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to put forward a new family of risk measures that are associated
with the optimal policies of shareholder value maximizing company. We call them share-
holder risk measures. Due to the specific corporate environment, in particular the limited
shareholders’ liability and the possibility to pay out dividends from the cash reserves, these
risk measures are not convex. Also, they depend on the specific economic situation of the
firm, in particular the current cash level, and thus they are not translation invariant.
In the work by Artzner and al. [2], a risk measure ρ is defined using a set of axioms, which
represent some properties that a risk measure should have in an abstract set-up: ρ is a
real-valued function which is positively homogeneous, subadditive, translation invariant and
monotone. Such risk measures are called coherent. An important extension of the concept
of coherent risk measures is the notion of convex risk measures, developed simultaneously
by Föllmer and Schied [10] and Fritelli and Rosazza-Gianin [12], who proposed to relax
the properties of subadditivity and positive homogeneity of ρ with the weaker property of
convexity:
ρ(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ λρ(X) + (1− λ)ρ(Y ), ∀λ ∈ [0, 1].
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A risk measure ρ(·) imposes a preference order on random variables, but more than this,
it corresponds to a price, hence it is expressed in monetary units. This last point is specific
to risk measures, as opposed to the previously developed theory of expected utility of von
Neumann and Morgenstern [20]. Many links with expected utility theory exist. For instance,
in the case of a specific class of risk measures called shortfall risk measures, introduced by
Föllmer and Schied [10]: if we consider a convex increasing function (not identically constant)
ℓ : R → R, and an interior point x0 in the range of ℓ, the following function is a coherent
risk measure:
ρ(X) := inf{m ∈ R | E(ℓ(−m−X) ≤ x0}
Since the function u(x) := −ℓ(−x) is increasing concave, it can be interpreted as an utility
function, and if x0 = u(0) we can interpret ρ above as an indifference price for the cash flow
X.
Our aim in this paper is to develop new risk measures, that have similar properties as the
convex risk measures (i.e., they impose a preference order on random cash flows and can be
interpreted as prices). But, at the difference with the axiomatic approach of Artzner and
al. [2] and its subsequent extensions, our risk measures are derived from the dividend policy
- cash optimization problem faced by a firm under uncertainty. We thus make a bridge
between two different problems in corporate finance, namely the optimal dividend policy
and the measurement of risks.
In the dividend policy literature, given the characteristics of the cash flow process of a
firm, two fundamental questions are addressed: when should dividends be distributed, and
how much of the available cash should be distributed. The answer to these questions is
called a dividend strategy. The classical approach, initiated by de Finetti [8], is to maximize
the the expected present value of all (future) dividends that will be distributed until the
company is ruined (we shall call this quantity the shareholder value). A rich literature has
investigated this important topic (see a selection in Subsection 3.2 below).
Assuming that the objective of the firm is to maximize shareholder value1, we examine in
this paper the impact of a random shock X on the firm’s cash reserves on shareholder value
and use it as a measure of the risk of the random shockX. The properties of the resulting risk
measures are afterwards analyzed. This approach has the advantage that it displays some
specific features of the risk measures, such as the non convexity or the absence of translation
invariance. Even though model dependent, our approach helps to understand from where
these a-typical and perhaps at first sight non-intuitive features of our proposed risk measures
come from: we show that the particular corporate environment, such as limited liability for
shareholders and the possibility to pay dividends from the available cash, lead to such specific
risk measures. Of course, in practice shareholder value depends on many other variables than
cash reserves, such as assets profitability, growth opportunities, macroeconomic context. We
abstract from these exogenous variables for the sake of clarity.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes important
concepts and definitions, Section 3 introduces the shareholder value maximization problem
and characterizes the value function and the optimal dividend strategies. In Section 4 we
establish the main properties of the SRM as opposed to the convex risk measures. Section 5
1This is indeed the mandate given to the manager by the owners of the firm. We leave aside agency
conflicts, i.e., what happens when the manager pursues its own objectives at the expense of shareholders.
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is an introduction to the dynamic SRM, i.e., when the random shock affects the cash reserves
at some future date.
2. Some useful definitions
The dividend policy - cash optimization problem which will be at the base of our discussion
gives raise to a value function that is not concave everywhere. It is useful therefore to
introduce from now the concept of shareholder value function as:
Definition 2.1. A shareholder value function is a real valued function v that maps the
level of the cash reserves of the firm to its shareholder value, is increasing, nonnegative and
satisfies v(x) ≥ x.
Let X be a set of random variables on the probability space (Ω,F ,P). A risk measure is
a mapping ρ from a X to the real line. Let us now review two common ways of measuring a
risk X and then propose a third method which will be the one we shall study in this paper.
In all cases, we use a shareholder value function v, and we suppose that an agent (the firm
in our case) has already an available cash flow k. In order to emphasize the links with the
utility theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern we introduce the function:
uk(x) := v(k + x)− v(k).
(1) Indifference price:
ρk(X) := inf{m | E[uk(X +m)] ≥ 0}.
This is a generalization of the classical approach of shortfall risk measures seen as the
distance to some convex acceptable set of random variables. Indeed, we can define the
following acceptance set Ak := {x ∈ X | E(ℓk(−X)] ≤ 0}, with ℓk(x) = −uk(−x).
Then ρk(X) = inf{m | X +m ∈ Ak} as in [2], but here Ak is not convex when v is
not concave.
Also, let us note that, on the level sets where v is strictly increasing and concave,
ρ can be seen as the indifference price from the expected utility theory, since it is the
unique solution m of the equation: E[uk(m + X)] = uk(0) = 0. But ρ can also be
(and is commonly) interpreted as a capital requirement.
(2) Certainty equivalent:
CEk(X) := − inf{m|E[uk(X)] ≤ uk(m)}.
This measure corresponds to the concept of the certainty equivalent for X, i.e., the
sure amount for which an agent remains indifferent to a lottery X. Indeed, if we
suppose again that v is concave so that uk(x) = v(k + x) − v(k) can be interpreted
as an utility function in a classical sense, then CEk(x) = u
−1
k E[uk(X)], where u
−1
k is
the left-continuous inverse of uk.
We put forward a new class of risk measures:
(3) Impact price, or shareholder risk measure:
SRMk(X) := v(k)− E[v(k +X)] = −E[uk(X)]
This is a measure of the loss in shareholder value that a random cash flow produces,
supposing shareholder value function is v. We shall endogenize the function v for the
shareholder value maximization. Note that SRM is conceptually different from the
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measures presented above in (1) and (2). It is related to the utility theory of von
Neumann and Morgenstern with the following notable difference that the ”utility”
function we use:
(a) is not a concave function;
(b) depends on the current cash level in the firm. This means that as the cash level
of the firm evolves, the ”utility” function changes. Since the cash evolution is
random, the utility function that will apply at a future date is a random variable;
(c) can be extended to a dynamic set-up.
(d) represents a price, i.e., can be expressed in monetary units;
We can already remark that the fact that the cash invariance property fails, is a con-
sequence of the fact that SRM is not defined as a distance to some acceptable set, as is
the case of the coherent (and convex) risk measures, the financial interpretation being that
cash has sometimes more value inside the company than in the shareholder’s pocket (or the
opposite). The nonconvexity of SRM is linked to the nonconcavity of the function v. As
the set of acceptable risks Ak := {X | SRM(X) ≤ 0} is not convex, a risk measure in the
spirit of [2] is also non convex. At fixed level of the cash k in the firm, we shall nevertheless
identify some classes of risks for which SRM is convex or translation invariant (within a
given range of the cash being added/subtracted).
It can seem at a first sight surprising to have risk measures that may penalize diversifi-
cation. Quasi-concavity of risk measures seems to be a very natural feature, and SRM do
not satisfy this property in general. Let us emphasize again that here we do not take the
point of view of regulators, nor of a manager of some given portfolio in a company. From the
shareholders’ perspective, it is not always preferable to diversify risks involving both some
positive payments and, as a downside, the default of the company. If we exclude these risks,
we obtain what we shall call the class of sustainable risks, i.e., all random payments that do
not produce the default of the company. SRM is convex for the sustainable risks..
Finally, let us point out that it is of course possible to construct a robust version of the




this being perfectly compatible with the model we describe below (including in the dynamic
version of SRM).
3. Shareholder value maximization
This section presents the problem of optimal cash management of a firm optimizing the
flow of dividends payed to the shareholders. Our aim is to emphasize some properties of the
value function. We suppose that in absence of dividend payments, the available cash reserve
of a firm follows, as time goes on, a jump diffusion. At any time, as long as the cash reserve
remains positive, the firm can decide to pay a part of the available cash as dividends. The
objective is to determine the dividend scheme that maximizes the expected discounted flow
of dividends till the bankruptcy time (which is the first time when the cash process is less
than zero).
The mathematical formulation is as follows. We suppose that (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P) is a filtered
probability space and (Wt) a standard Brownian motion. Let Ñ be an (Ft) compensated
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Ñ(t, A) = N(t, A)− E[N(t, A)] = N(t, A)− ν(A)t
where for every Borel set A, N(t, A) is a Poisson random measure measuring the number of
jumps with amplitude in A, up to and including time t and ν is the Lévy measure associated
with N (here assumed to be finite).
Starting from an initial state k ∈ R for the cash level and given a dividend policy (ξt) (i.e.,
our control process), the dynamics of the cash reserve process of the firm is governed by:
dCt = b(Ct)du+ σdWt +
∫
R
zÑ(dt, dz)− dξt, (3.1)
C0− = k (3.2)
with b(x) = µ + rx. The function b corresponds to the sum of expected earnings and
interests paid on the cash reserves (Ct). The process (ξt) is an adapted increasing process,
right-continuous, with ξ0− = 0, representing the cumulated dividend payments till time t (our
control process). Hence, the dynamics of the process in (3.1) represents the economically
meaningful evolution of cash reserves. More general dynamics would make no sense in this
context.
As it is common in the theory of Markov processes, we introduce a family of probability
measures (Px)x∈R, corresponding to a translation of (Ct) such that C0− = x under P
x and
thus allow having arbitrary initial conditions. We write Pk = P. We denote Ex for the
expectation operator under the measure Px.
Let:
τ = inf{t ≥ 0 | Ct < 0}
be the time of bankruptcy of the firm. Obviously (Ct) and τ depend on the chosen dividend
policy (ξt). We use the simple notations that do not make explicit this dependence and







, ρ > 0 constant.
be the expected total discounted amount of dividends payed to the shareholders up to the






. The discount rate ρ is constant.





(A2) ρ > r.
(A3) σ 6= 0.
Let us point out that the case σ = 0 is treated in Albrecher and Thonhauser [1].
We define the set of admissible controls A as the set of adapted, nondecreasing, càdlàg
processes ξ such that a unique strong solution (Ct) of (3.1) exists, and such that for any
stopping times S ≤ T we have:
∫ T
S
Csdξs ≥ 0. This last condition ensures that no dividends
are payed that would exceed the cash reserve available.
We assume that the objective of the firm is to implement such a dividend policy ξ∗ that











































































In the remaining of this section we aim to emphasize some properties of the function v
which are useful later on, in particular the fact that it is not a concave function on R but it
is concave on R+.
Let us introduce the characteristic operator LC defined on a function F : R → R as
follows:
LCF (x) = lim
U↓x
ExF (CTU )− F (x)
ExTU
where the limit is taken over a family of open sets U shrinking down to x in R and TU =
inf{t ≥ 0 | Ct ∈ U c}. From the general theory of Markov processes we know that the
characteristic operator LC that corresponds the jump diffusion appearing in (3.1) when no




















Also, it will be useful to recall the following definition for the local time appearing in the
solution of the Skorohod problem for jump diffusions:
Definition 3.1. Let O ⊂ R be an open set. The Skorohod problem for the reflected jump
diffusion C into Ō is to find a pair (Ct, ξt) of càdlàg adapted processes such that the following
conditions are satisfied:
dCt = b(Ct)dt+ σdWt +
∫
R
zÑ(dt, dz)− dξt, (3.4)
Ct ∈ Ō, ∀t ≥ 0, (3.5)
(ξt) has finite variation and dξt = 0 if Xt ∈ O. (3.6)
The process ξ is called the local time at the boundary ∂O of the reflected process C.
3.1. A characterization of the optimal dividend strategy. The theorem below states
some properties of the value function when it is sufficiently smooths and of the corresponding
optimal dividend strategy.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose that there exists a function φ ∈ C2((0,∞))∩C(R) such that φ solves








= 0, ∀x ∈ (0,∞) (3.7)
φ(x) = 0, ∀x ≤ 0, (3.8)
with the set {x ∈ (0,∞) | LCφ(x)− ρφ(x) < 0} being non empty.
Then:
(i) There exists a constant x∗ ≥ 0 such that:
O :=
{






(the non intervention set).
(ii) φ is concave on the interval [0,∞).
6






































































(iv) The optimal control ξ∗ is the local time at x∗ of the jump diffusion C reflected back
into (0, x∗].
Proof. In this proof, we se shall always use the notation φ′(0) for the right-hand derivative
at zero.
Let us introduce the following subset:
D : =
{
x ∈ (0,∞) | ∂φ
∂x
(x) = 1 and LCφ(x)− ρφ(x) ≤ 0
}
O and D are disjoint sets. Moreover, by definition of φ we have O ∪ D = (0,∞). O is
open and the interior of D is not empty (since the set {x ∈ (0,∞) | LCφ(x)− ρφ(x) < 0} is
supposed non empty).
We now show that O = (0, x∗) and hence D = [x∗,∞) for some x∗ ≥ 0 (with x∗ = 0 for
O = ∅).
If µ = b(0) ≤ 0 then φ(x) = x ∨ 0 is a solution of (3.7), (3.8) and D = (0,∞), hence in
this case (i) and (ii) hold.
We now study the case µ > 0. In this case, 0 /∈ D̄ and hence ∃x̂ > 0 such that (0, x̂) ∈ O
and x̂ ∈ D (D being non empty). Also, notice that inD, LCφ(x)−ρφ(x) = b(x)−ρ(x+K) :=
h(x) with K some constant such that h(x) ≤ 0. The function h(x) is strictly decreasing
(b′(x) < ρ), hence if y belongs to the inte ior of D then [y,∞) ∈ D. Hence ∃x∗ such that
[x∗,∞) ∈ D. In order to show that D = [x∗,∞), it remains to show that D does not have
isolated points, other configurations for D being already excluded by the above remarks.
If D has one ore several isolated points, then necessarily φ′(x) is not monotonic, D be-
ing precisely the set where φ′ attains its minimum. We will show that D does not have
isolated points by showing that φ′(x) is necessarily monotonic on (0,∞). We shall see this
simultaneously proves the concavity of φ on [0,∞).

















The function g(x) satisfies g(0) < 0, hence φ concave in O near 0. In other words, the
function φ′ > 1 and decreasing in O near 0.
Suppose that φ′ is not monotonic in (0, x∗], then there should be at least a local maximum
of φ′ inside (0, x∗), at a point say xm and a local minimum at a point say xm with xm < x
m.
Our first task is to show that the global maximum of φ′(x) is attained at x = 0. Our
second task is to prove (using this property of the global maximum) that φ′(x) cannot have
a local maximum at xm.
For the moment, let us assume such a local maximum of φ′ at xm ∈ (0,m∗) exists and
furthermore that it is a global maximum. Hence φ′′(x) switches the sign at some point









































































We now show that this is impossible. The sign of φ′′(x) is given by the sign of the function
g(x), since by assumption (A3), σ 6= 0. We have that:








(using: φ′′(xm) = 0, (A2) and the relation (3.9)). This shows that the relation (3.9) cannot
hold, hence the maximum of φ′(x) needs to be attained at the boundary, i.e., at x = 0
and φ′(xm) can only be a local maximum. Now assume that the parameters of the problem
enable this to happen, i.e., we have:
g′(xm) < 0. (3.10)
Without loss of generality, we suppose φ′(xm) is the maximum value of φ′ that also satisfies
φ′′ = 0 (i.e., φ′(xm) is the maximum among all local maximums that exist for φ′ inside the
interval (0, x∗)).
As emphasized earlier, a local minimum needs to exist too, more precisely, ∃ 0 < xm < xm
such that φ′′(xm) = 0 and
g′(xm) > 0. (3.11)
Without loss of generality, we assume that xm is the first local minimum of φ
′, i.e., φ′ is
decreasing on the interval (0, xm]. Due to our assumptions on xm and x
m we have that
A := {x ∈ (0,∞) | φ′(x) > φ(xm)} ⊂ [0, xm) and φ′ decreasing in A. Since it is necessary
to have φ′(xm) <
∫
[−xm,∞)




φ′(xm+ z)ν(dz) = φ′(ym) for some ym ∈ A. Since xm < xm it follows that
∃ 0 ≤ ym ≤ ym < xm such that
∫
[−xm,∞)
φ′(xm + z)ν(dz) = φ
′(ym).
Substracting (3.11) from (3.10) and because φ′ decreasing on [0, xm] we obtain that:
(1 + ρ− r)(φ′(xm)− φ′(xm)) <
∫
[0,∞)
(φ′(xm + z)− φ′(xm + z))ν(dz)
= φ′(ym)− φ′(ym) < 0.
But this is a contradiction, since obviously we must have (1 + ρ − r)(φ′(xm) − φ′(xm)) > 0
(both ρ > r and φ′(xm) > φ′(xm) must hold).
This proves that a local maximum for φ′ inside (0, x∗) cannot exist, i.e. φ′′ cannot switch
the sign from being positive to being negative in (0, x∗). Hence, φ′(x) is monotonically
decreasing on [0, x∗), i.e., φ is concave on [0, x∗).
This proves also that D = [x∗,∞) and O = (0, x∗) for some x∗ ≥ 0 (with x∗ = 0 for
O = ∅), hence (i).
(ii) is a consequence of the fact that φ is C2 concave on (0, x∗) and linear on (x∗,∞).
The proof of (iii) is classical. Suppose that x > 0. Choose any dividend policy ξ ∈ A and
t in the stochastic interval [0, τ ]. By Itô’s formula for the semimartingale C (recall that φ is
8



























































































where (tn) are the jumping times of ξ and ∆ξφ(Ctn) = φ(Ctn) − φ(Ctn + ∆ξtn)) is the
variation of φ due to the jump ∆ξtn = ξtn − ξtn−. Since φ is increasing and ξ increasing, all
∆ξφ(Ctn) ≤ 0.
Therefore, using (3.7):












(Cs)dWs, t ≥ 0 is a local martingale. We take a localizing
sequence (Ta)a≥1 of this local martingale. We then define the increasing sequence of stopping
times τa := Ta ∧ τ, a ≥ 1. Since the sequence (mτa) is uniformly integrable, it follows from
the above inequalities that also the sequence (e−ρτaφ(Cτa)) is uniformly integrable.
Taking expected value in (3.12) with t = τa, we obtain:




















From the inequations (3.7) we have that LCφ(x)− ρφ(x) ≤ 0. It follows that:




















for some point xn on the straight line between Ctn − ∆ξtn and Ctn . Using the inequality
∂φ
∂x
≥ 1, we obtain:







Letting a → ∞, since (φ(Cτa)) is uniformly integrable, lima→∞ τa = τ and φ(Cτ ) = 0 a.s.,
we obtain that:
φ(x) ≥ Jξ(x).
As this holds for any admissible control ξ, and since for x ≤ 0 we have by definition φ(x) =
v(x) = 0, we conclude that:
φ(x) ≥ v(x), ∀x ∈ R. (3.13)
9




































































In particular, since it is admissible to pay immediately time 0 dividends in amount C0,
v(x) ≥ x and hence we must also have:
φ(x) ≥ x.
Now suppose that ξt = L
y
t , the local time at y > 0 of the process C reflected back into
(0, y], for some y ≥ 0. Note that Ly ∈ A. Indeed, Ly is adapted, increasing, and càdlàg.
Moreover, a unique strong solution of (3.1) when ξt = L
y
t exists (see [7]).







solves the problem (3.7)-(3.8) for every x ∈ R. Combined with the inequality (3.13) this will
prove that Lx
∗
is the optimal strategy and φ = v.





. Given x ∈ (0, y),
choose ǫ such that (x − ǫ, x + ǫ) ∈ (0, y) and denote Tǫ := inf{t ≥ 0 | Ct ∈ (x − ǫ, x + ǫ)c}.














We have used the fact that Tǫ ≤ τ a.s. and
∫ Tǫ
0





















This shows that LCg
y(x)− ρgy(x) = 0 for x ∈ (0, y). Also, by definition of Ly we have that
gy(y + c) = gy(y) + c,∀c > 0. Therefore, for any x ∈ (y,∞) gy(x) is linear (hence C2) and it
can be checked that both ∂g
y
∂x
(x) = 1 and LCg
y(x)− ρgy(x) < 0 hold.
Let us notice that gy(x) = 0 for x ≤ 0, that is equation (3.8) is verified by gy.
In order to prove points (iii) and (iv) of the theorem it is now sufficient to show that ∃ x∗
in [0,∞) such that gx∗ is C2((0,∞)). But this fact is ensured by the fact that a C2 solution
to (3.7) is assumed to exist plus the previous remark that the set O must be of the form
(0, x∗). 
The next Corollary emphasizes the fact that the function v is a shareholder value function
(see Definition 2.1) and therefore the corresponding risk measures will not be convex. As we
have shown, v is concave on (0,∞), the concavity breaks down on [−∞,∞] as a consequence
of the existence of the limited liability for shareholders.
Corollary 3.3. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.2, the value function v(x) is a share-
holder value function. It is constant on R− and concave on R+.
3.2. Some bibliographical comments and particular examples. There exists an ex-
tensive literature on barrier strategies for dividends, i.e., dividend payouts that are the local
time of the cash process at an upper level. Let us mention that the book by Schmidli [23],
treats among other topics the problem of dividend distributions in insurance companies and
the reader can find an overview of the topic.
These models were initially developed by actuaries, where the cash process was considered
to be the surplus of an insurance company. Dividends distributions of barrier type have
10




































































been shown to be optimal for some types of cash processes. The first model of this type was
elaborated by de Finetti [8]; he showed that if the risk/surplus process evolves as a random
walk with step sizes ±1, then an optimal way of paying out dividends is according to a
barrier strategy. In the case of continuous-time models, the problem of finding the optimal
dividend strategy has been studied extensively in the Cramér–Lundberg setting (Gerber [13];
Azcue and Muler [5]) and in the diffusion setting (Jeanblanc and Shiryaev [15]; Asmussen
and Taksar [3]; Gerber and Shiu [14]). It was recently generalized to the spectrally negative
Lévy model by Avram et al. [4], Kyprianou and Palmowski [16] and Loeffen [19], where the
surplus is a general Lévy process with only negative jumps.
In the Cramér–Lundberg setting, the cash process is described by a Lévy process without
the Brownian part (this would correspond to our model with r = σ = 0). Our condition
(A3) was important in our proof of the Theorem 3.2 and it makes that our model does not
to fit the Cramér–Lundberg setting. Notice that Gerber [13] has shown that not only barrier
but also band strategies can be optimal in the Cramér–Lundberg setting. A band strategy
is such that the cash process is reflected at an upper barrier and absorbed to zero by paying
a dividend once it crosses a lower barrier. This strategy can be optimal for some spectrally
negative Lévy cash process (see also Azcue and Muler [5]) and for some models falling in the
class studied in Abrecher and Thonhauser [1] (here again not containing a Brownian part).
We should emphasize that in the case of band strategies, the value function v(x) is non
concave even on R+, and also non smooth (in the sense that the first derivative is discontin-
uous). Concrete examples can be found for instance in Azcue and Muler [5] and Abrecher
and Thonhauser [1] . In this case the value function remains however a shareholder value
function (in the sense of our Definition 2.1) and a supremum of concave functions.
In the case of our model, the brownian component makes that paying out the cash entirely
as a dividend triggers the default of the firm. Hence, we have the boundary condition
v(0) = 0. This property excludes to have band strategies, as optimal strategies, even in the
situations where the value function would not be smooth (i.e., C2(0,∞)).
Below we give some examples of cash processes and the associated value functions.
3.2.1. Brownian Motion. This model is presented in Jeanblanc-Picqué and Shiryaev [15] and
Shreve, Lehoczky and Gaver [24]. Suppose b(x) ≡ µ > 0 and N(t, A) ≡ 0 for any Borel set





0 ≤ x ≤ x∗







and r1 > 0 > r2 are the roots of the equation: σ
2r2 + 2µr − 2ρ = 0.
v(x) = v(x∗) + x− x∗ for x > x∗.
3.2.2. Linear drift. Suppose that b(x) = µ+ rx and N(t, A) ≡ 0 for any Borel set A.
We obtain that v is solution of:
σ2
2
v′′(x) + (µ+ rx)v′(x)− ρv(x) = 0 (3.14)
v(0) = 0 (3.15)
v′(x∗) = 1 (3.16)
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Figure 1. Value function v(x) when the cash process X is a Brownian Motion.

















f ′ − λf = 0, (3.17)
with λ := (r − ρσ2/2)/2r.
We denote by F (a, b, x) the standard confluent hypergeometric function (or Kummer’s
function) which arises as a solution of confluent hypergeometric differential equation xy′′ +
(b− x) y′ − ay = 0. The solution of the equation (3.17) is:
f(y) = C1f1(y) + C2f2(y),
where C1 et C2 are constants and f1 and f2 are two independent solutions:
f1(y) = F (λ, 1/2, y)
f2(y) = y






































(with the constants C1 and C2 fully determined by the boundary conditions).
3.2.3. Negative, exponentially distributed jumps. The case with r = 0, ν(dz) = 1z<0λδe
−δzdz
is studied in Belhaj [6] (see page 319 for the optimal value function and the barrier level in
this model).
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4. Properties of shareholder risk measures
We want to establish some properties of the shareholder risk measure (SRM) generated
by the shareholder value function v that is the solution of the optimization problem from
the previous section, or more generally using a shareholder value function that is concave
on (0,∞) and is linear and on (x∗,∞) with x∗ ≥ 0 (one can have in mind Figure 1).
The objective is too see how different the SRM is as compared to the classical convex risk
measures.
We recall that a convex risk measure ρ : X → R is defined by the following properties:
(1) Monotonicity: If X ≤ Y , then ρ(X) ≥ ρ(Y ).
(2) Translation Invariance: If m ∈ R, then ρ(Y +m) = ρ(Y )−m.
(3) Convexity: For any λ ∈ R, ρ(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ λρ(X)− (1− λ)ρ(Y ).
4.1. Shareholder risk measures: a definition and some properties. Assume that we
are time zero and an amount k ∈ [0, x∗] of cash is available in the firm. Then, as described
in the previous section, the shareholders value their shares as v(k). If a random cash flow
X is about to affect the cash available in the firm, then the shareholders measure the risk of
this random cash flow by its impact on their shareholder value.
We therefore define the following:
Definition 4.1. (1) We denote by X the class of random variables X on (Ω,F) such
that E[v(k+X)] < ∞. The (instantaneous) shareholder risk measure for any X ∈ X
is defined as:
SRM(X) := v(k)− E[v(k +X)].
(2) We denote Xk := {X ∈ X | X > −k} i.e., the set of risks bounded below by −k. Xk
is called the set of sustainable risks. Each risk in this class does not trigger the firm’s
default, since the firm has sufficient cash to absorb its possible losses.
(3) The set of random variablesX satisfyingE[v(k+X)] ≥ v(k) or equivalently SRM(X) ≤
0 is called the set of acceptable risks.
The intuition behind the definitions above is simple. If the cash process of the firm is
impacted by a random variable X, then the value of the cash process changes from k to
k + X and the value function from v(k) to v(k + X). The SRM evaluates the impact
on the value function just before the random shock arrives, i.e., when there is no time to
adjust the dividend policy before the occurrence of the shock. If the risk X is such that
E[v(k+X)] < v(k) it would be more convenient for shareholders to refuse being exposed to
the risk X. We say that such risks are not acceptable. Note that concept of acceptability
here is different in its interpretation from the one introduced in Delbaen and al. [2], where
a risk is not acceptable when it requires additional capital. In our setting, shareholders take
only the decision of the dividend policy and we do not allow for new capital injections.
Notation 4.2. With any random variable X ∈ X we attach a random variable Xk ∈ Xk by:
Xk := X1{X>−k} − k1{X≤−k} = max{X,−k}.
Proposition 4.3 (Basic properties of the shareholder risk measure). SRM satisfies the
following properties:
(i) SRM(0) = 0. More generally, if X is such that Xk = 0 a.s., then SRM(X) = 0.
(ii) General upper bound: SRM(X) ≤ v(k).
13




































































(iii) Monotonicity: if X and Y are such that Xk > Yk a.s. then SRM(X) < SRM(Y ).
(iv) For X ≥ x∗−k and m ≥ x∗−(k+X) SRM has the property of translation invariance:
SRM(X +m) = SRM(X)−m.
(v) Quasi-convexity and quasi-concavity (partial): if X and Y are such that Xk ≥ Yk
a.s., then for λ ∈ (0, 1),
min{SRM(X), SRM(Y )} ≤ SRM(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ max{SRM(X), SRM(Y )}.
(vi) Law equivariance: if X and Y are such that Xk and Yk have the same distribution,
then SRM(X) = SRM(Y ).
Proof. (iii) Since Xk > Yk a.s. and v is strictly increasing on [0,∞), we have that v(k +
X) = v(k+Xk) > v(k+ Yk) = v(k+ Y ) and the result follows from the definition of
SRM.
(iv) consequence of the fact that v(x) is linear for x > x∗.
(v) We suppose thatX and Y are such thatXk ≥ Yk a.s.. In this case v(k+X) ≥ v(k+Y )
a.s. and therefore:
E[v(k + λX + (1− λ)Y )] ≥ E[min(v(k +X), v(k + Y ))]
= E[v(k + Y ))] = min{E[v(k +X)],E[v(k + Y )]}
and:
E[v(k + λX + (1− λ)Y )] ≤ E[max(v(k +X), v(k + Y ))]
= E[v(k +X))] = max{E[v(k +X)],E[v(k + Y )]}
It follows that the properties quasi-concavity and the quasi-convexity of SRM are
satisfied for X and Y when Xk > Yk a.s..

We now write an equivalent form for the acceptable SRM , which emphasizes some simi-
larities and differences with a class of law-equivariant or law-determined risk measures (also
known as law-invariant risk measures). Kusuoka [18] has shown that every law equivari-
ant, commonotonically additive risk measure can be represented as the expectation of the
risk under a convexly distorted distribution. Namely, there exists a distortion D (i.e.,









where FX(x) := P(X ≤ x).
Notation 4.4. On the interval [0, x∗], the function v is strictly concave therefore v′ is in-
vertible. We denote by (v′)−1 the inverse of v′. By the mean value theorem, we have that for
x > −k, there exists a point y between k and x+ k such that v(k+x)− v(k) = xv′(y). Since
we have k ∈ (0, x∗), the point y also satisfies y ∈ (0, x∗). Therefore, we define the function:
gk(x) =:
{






if x ∈ R∗
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We also introduce the notations:
FX(x) : = P(X ≤ x)
FXk(x) : = P(Xk ≤ x)






(i) If X > 0 a.s., we have that
∫
R
xv′ (gk(x)) dFXk(x) ≥ E(Xk) = E[X] hence:
SRM(X) ≤ −E(X)
(ii) If X < 0 a.s., we have that
∫
R
xv′ (gk(x)) dFXk(x) ≤ E[Xk] hence:
SRM(X) ≥ −E(Xk)
Let us comment on the above representations of ρ versus SRM . Any law invariant com-
monotone risk measure for X can be written as an expected value of −X under a new
probability measure. This probability measure is obtained by distorting the law of X using
a given function D (thus for risks having different laws we get different probabilities after
distortion). When computing the SRM for X, we also compute the expectation of −X,
but under a measure which is not a probability measure anymore. More precisely, because
v′(x) ≥ 1 on R+ we have that the new measure has a total mass which exceeds 1. The new
measure depends not only on the law of X (in fact on the law of Xk), but also on the level
of cash in the firm k. The higher the cash level, the lower the total mass of our measure
change.
4.2. Further properties of SRM: the case of bounded risks.
Proposition 4.6 (Convexity for sustainable risks). Let X ∈ Xk and Y ∈ Xk. Then, for any
λ ∈ [0, 1] we have:
SRM(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ λSRM(X)− (1− λ)SRM(Y ).
The same holds, if, more generally, {X < −k} = {Y < −k} (thus X and Y need not be
sustainable).
Proof. Xk is convex and v is concave on R+. Hence for X ∈ Xk and Y ∈ Xk:
SRM(λX + (1− λ)Y ) = v(k)− E [v (λ(k +X) + (1− λ)(k + Y ))]
≤ v(k)− E [λv(k +X) + (1− λ)v(k + Y )]
= λSRM(X)− (1− λ)SRM(Y ).
The same holds if {X < −k} = {Y < −k}, because for all λ ∈ [0, 1] we have {X < −k} =
{λX + (1− λ)Y } = {Y < −k}. 
Proposition 4.7 (Translation by a constant). Suppose that X ∈ [xmin, xmax] for xmax, xmin
constants and we take m constant.
(1) For moderate values of m, namely: if −v(k + xmin) ≤ m < 0 or 0 < m ≤ v−1(m)−
(k + xmax), then:
SRM(X +m) ≥ SRM(X)−m
15




































































(2) For extreme values of m, namely: if m < −v(k + xmax) or m > max(v−1(m)− (k +
xmin); 0), then:
SRM(X +m) ≤ SRM(X)−m
Proof. Let us suppose that m < 0.
If k + X + m ≥ 0, then necessarily k + X > 0 and v(k + X) − v(k + X + m) ≥ −m
(because v′(x) ≥ 1 for x ∈ R+ and we can use the mean value theorem). It follows that
SRM(X +m) ≥ SRM(X)−m.
If k + X + m < 0, and k + X ≤ 0 then v(k + X) = v(k + X + m) = 0 and hence,
v(k+X)−v(k+X+m) = 0 < −m. It follows in this case that SRM(X+m) < SRM(X)−m.
If k+X+m < 0, and k+X ∈ [0, v−1(−m)] then v(k+X)−v(k+X+m) = v(k+X) < −m,
therefore SRM(X +m) < SRM(X)−m.
If k+X+m < 0, and k+X ∈ [v−1(−m),−m] then v(k+X)−v(k+X+m) = v(k+X) >
−m, therefore SRM(X +m) > SRM(X)−m.
Summarizing the above we get: If m < 0 constant, then:
• If X ≥ v−1(−m)− k, then SRM(X +m) ≥ SRM(X)−m;
• If X ≤ v−1(−m)− k, then SRM(X +m) ≤ SRM(X)−m.
We now suppose that m > 0.
If v(k + X + m) ≤ m, then necessarily k + X < 0 and v(k + X) − v(k + X + m) =
−v(k +X +m) ≥ −m. It follows that SRM(X +m) ≥ SRM(X)−m.
If v(k+X+m) > m, and k+X ≤ 0 then v(k+X)−v(k+X+m) = −v(k+X+m) < −m.
It follows in this case that SRM(X +m) < SRM(X)−m.
If v(k +X +m) > m, and k +X > 0 then we also have v(k +X)− v(k +X +m) < −m
(since v′(x) ≥ 1 for x ∈ R+ and we can use the mean value theorem) hence SRM(X +m) <
SRM(X)−m.
Summarizing for m > 0, we get:
• If X ≥ v−1(m)−m− k, then SRM(X +m) ≤ SRM(X)−m;
• If X ≤ v−1(m)−m− k, then SRM(X +m) ≥ SRM(X)−m.
Combining the results for m > 0 and m < 0 we get the result stated in the proposition. 
One can notice that the following result was proved inside the proof of Proposition 4.7
(where in a first step we were not using upper and lower bounds for X):
Corollary 4.8. Suppose that X∈Xk and m constant such that X + m ∈ Xk. Then, the
following hold:
(1) If m < 0 then SRM(X +m) ≥ SRM(X)−m;
(2) If m > 0 then SRM(X +m) ≤ SRM(X)−m.
The corollary above emphasizes that SRM fails to be translation invariant even when
restricted to the case of sustainable risks. Intuitively, cash has more value when kept inside
the company (except in the region where dividend distributions occur, as characterized in
Proposition 4.3 (iv)).
The set Xk of sustainable risks has the convenient property of being a convex set. There-
fore, we can construct a convex risk measure for Xk as follows. Let us denote by
Sk := {X ∈ Xk | SRM(X) ≥ 0}
16




































































i.e., the set of sustainable and acceptable risks. This being also a convex set, we further
denote for all x ∈ Xk:
ρS(X) = inf{m ≥ −k | X ∈ Sk}. (4.1)
ρS is a convex risk measure (this can be checked using the Theorem 4.7 in [11]). The
following result shows that the coherent measure ρS is more conservative, in the sense that
it underestimates the non acceptable risks as compared with SRM.
Corollary 4.9. Let X ∈ Xk and ρS be as in (4.1). Then:
(1) If X ∈ Sk then SRM(X) ≤ ρS(X).
(2) If X /∈ Sk then SRM(X) ≥ ρS(X).
Proof. Notice first that ρS is the unique solution for:
E[v(k +X +m)] = v(k). (4.2)
That ρS solves (4.2) follows by dominated convergence, since the function v is continuous
and the solution is unique since v is strictly increasing (indeed, since X ∈ Xk we need to
consider the properties of the function v on R+ only).
As a consequence:
SRM(X + ρS(X)) = 0.
Consider that X ∈ Sk. Then ρS(X) ≤ 0. Therefore, from Corollary 4.8, we obtain that:
0 = SRM(X + ρS(X)) ≥ SRM(X)− ρS(X).
On the other hand, if X ∈ Sk then ρS(X) ≥ 0. Therefore, again from Corollary 4.8, we
obtain that:
0 = SRM(X + ρS(X)) ≤ SRM(X)− ρS(X).

5. Risk measures associated with cash flows arriving at a future date
Let us now assume that the random shock X will affect the cash flow process at a future
date T ≥ 0, the risk is hence characterized by the couple (T,X). We assume that the
shareholders can implement dividend strategies optimally, anticipating the random shock
(T,X). In this case, the value function will be different from the one characterized in
Section 3 and the definition of SRM should be extended to reflect the anticipation of shocks
that arrive in the future.
For simplicity, we only consider here the case where the risk (T,X) has the characteristics:
(1) T is a stopping time in the filtration (Ft) generated by the cash process (Ct).
(2) X is a random variable independent from F∞.
We now define the cash process in presence of the random shock (T,X) and a dividend
process (ξt), as a stochastic process (C̃t) with dynamics:
dC̃t = dCt +Xd1{T≤t} for t ∈ [0,∞) (5.1)
C̃0− = k. (5.2)
The dependence in the chosen dividend strategy ξ is implicit via the process C.
17




































































We denote by (Gt) the natural augmented filtration of the process (C̃t). We have that
Gt = Ft ∨ σ(X1{T≤s}, s ≤ t) = Ft ∨ σ(X1{T≤t}) (the last equality holds because T is
considered a stopping time in the filtration (Ft)). In particular Ft = Gt for t < T . Let:
τ̃(t) := inf{s ≥ t | C̃s < 0}, t ≥ 0
i.e., τ̃(t) is the first time after time t when the cash process is negative, in presence of the
random shock (T,X). Similarily, we define for the process (Ct), i.e., in absence of the random
shock (T,X):
τ(t) := inf{s ≥ t | Cs < 0}, t ≥ 0.
For simplicity, we write τ̃ (respectively τ) for τ̃(0) (respectively τ(0)). The optimal dividend












with Ãt = Ã(t, C̃t), where Ã(t, x) is the set of admissible controls after time t, that is, the
set of (Gt)-adapted, nondecreasing, càdlàg processes ξ such that a unique strong solution




C̃sdξs ≥ 0. This last condition ensures that no dividends are payed that would
exceed the cash reserve available. We shall consider (Vt) to be right-continuous.
For defining the dynamic version of the SRM, we need to write more precisely the value
function before the random shock occurs. For this purpose, we introduce the two dimensional
process Z = (Z1, Z2), R+ × R-valued with components having the dynamics: dZ1s = ds,
dZ2s = dCZ10+s, s ≥ 0. We introduce a family of probability measures (P
(t,x))(t∈R+,x∈R) on
(R+ × R × Ω,B(R+ × R) ⊗ F) such that under P(t,x), the process Z starts at (t, x) (i.e.,
Z10 = t, Z
2
0 = x)). We denote hereafter E
(t,x) the expectation under P(t,x).
We also define:









By (slight) abuse of notation we have used above τ̃ = inf{s ≥ 0 | Z2s < 0}.
We now give an expression of the process V using the functions v and ṽ.
Proposition 5.1. The process V is given by:
Vt =
{
ṽ(t, Ct) if t < T ,
v(C̃t) if t ≥ T
Proof. Recall that for all t < T we have that C̃t = Ct and therefore Ft = Gt and Ãt =
Ã(t, Ct). Then:











since it corresponds precisely to the problem in (5.3).
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DELIA COCULESCU AND JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET
Abstract. The aim of this paper is to put forward a new family of risk measures that
could guide investment decisions of private companies. But at the difference of the classical
approach of Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and Heath (1999) and the subsequent extensions of this
model, our risk measures are built to reflect the risk perception of shareholders rather than
regulators. Instead of an axiomatic approach, we derive risk measures from the optimal
policies of shareholder value maximizing company. We study these optimal policies and the
related risk measures that we call shareholder risk measures. We emphasize the fact that
due to the specific corporate environment, in particular the limited shareholders’ liability
and the possibility to pay out dividends from the cash reserves, these risk measures are
not convex. Also, they depend on the specific economic situation of the firm, in particular
its current cash level, and thus they are not translation invariant. This paper bridges the
gap between two important branches of mathematical finance: risk measures and optimal
dividends.
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to put forward a new family of risk measures that are associated
with the optimal policies of a shareholder value maximizing company. We call them share-
holder risk measures. Due to the specific corporate environment, in particular the limited
shareholders’ liability and the possibility to pay out dividends from the cash reserves, these
risk measures are not convex. Also, they depend on the specific economic situation of the
firm, in particular the current cash level, and thus they are not translation invariant. Our
shareholder risk measures capture the privately optimal behavior of a company, from the
point of view of its shareholders. By contrast, traditional risk measures, that were developed
after the seminal work of Artzner and al. [3], adopt a normative approach, typically what a
regulator would impose to the company (for example in the form of a capital requirement),
with the aim of limiting the probability of failure.
In the work by Artzner and al. [3], a risk measure ρ is defined using a set of axioms, which
represent some properties that a risk measure should have in an abstract set-up: ρ is a func-
tional that assigns a real value to a random variable (the risk), it is positively homogeneous,
subadditive, translation invariant (also called cash invariant in this context) and monotone.
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Such risk measures are called coherent. An important extension of the concept of coherent
risk measures is the notion of convex risk measures, developed simultaneously by Föllmer
and Schied [14] and Fritelli and Rosazza-Gianin [16], who proposed to relax the properties
of subadditivity and positive homogeneity of ρ with the weaker property of convexity:
ρ(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ λρ(X) + (1− λ)ρ(Y ), ∀λ ∈ [0, 1].
Our aim in this paper is to develop new risk measures, that share some similar properties
with the convex risk measures: they create an ordering on random cash flows which is
consistent with preferences of a class of agents (here the shareholders of a company) and are
expressed in monetary units. But, at the difference of the axiomatic approach of Artzner
and al. [3] and its subsequent extensions, our risk measures are derived from the dividend
policy - cash optimization problem faced by a firm under uncertainty. We thus make a bridge
between two different problems in corporate finance, namely the optimal dividend policy and
the measurement of risks.
In the dividend policy literature, given the characteristics of the cash flow process of a
firm, two fundamental questions are addressed: when should dividends be distributed, and
how much of the available cash should be distributed. The answer to these questions is called
a dividend strategy. The classical approach, initiated by de Finetti [11], is to maximize the
expected present value of all (future) dividends that will be distributed until the company is
ruined (we shall call this quantity the shareholder value). A rich literature has investigated
this important topic (see a selection in Subsection 3.2 below).
Assuming that the objective of the firm is to maximize shareholder value1, we examine in
this paper the impact of a random shock X on the firm’s cash reserves on shareholder value
and use it as a measure of the risk of the random shockX. The properties of the resulting risk
measures are afterwards analyzed. This approach has the advantage that it displays some
specific features of the risk measures, such as the non convexity or the absence of translation
invariance. Even though model dependent, our approach helps to understand from where
these atypical and perhaps at first sight non-intuitive features of our proposed risk measures
come from: we show that the particular corporate environment, such as limited liability for
shareholders and the possibility to pay dividends from the available cash, lead to such specific
risk measures. Of course, in practice shareholder value depends on many other variables than
cash reserves, such as assets profitability, growth opportunities, macroeconomic context. We
abstract from these exogenous variables for the sake of clarity.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes important
concepts and definitions, Section 3 introduces the shareholder value maximization problem
and characterizes the value function and the optimal dividend strategies. In Section 4 we
establish the main properties of the SRM as opposed to the convex risk measures. Section 5
is an introduction to the dynamic SRM, i.e., when the random shock affects the cash reserves
at some future date.
1This is indeed the mandate given to the manager by the owners of the firm. We leave aside agency
conflicts, i.e., what happens when the manager pursues its own objectives at the expense of shareholders.
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2. Some useful definitions
The dividend policy - cash optimization problem which will be at the base of our discussion
gives raise to a value function that is not concave everywhere. It is useful therefore to
introduce from now the concept of shareholder value function as:
Definition 2.1. A shareholder value function is a real valued function v that maps the level
of the cash reserves of the firm to its shareholder value, it is increasing, nonnegative and
satisfies v(x) ≥ x.
The function v expresses the preference for more rather than less (by the property of being
increasing), the shareholder’s limited liabilities (by the non negativity of the function). The
last property is an expression of the fact that shareholders are owners and can decide to
liquidate a company if the cash value is higher. We shall develop later more economic
foundations for this shareholder value function.
Let X be a set of random variables on the probability space (Ω,F ,P). A risk measure is
a mapping ρ from a X to the real line. Let us now review two common ways of measuring a
risk X and then propose a third method which will be the one we shall study in this paper.
In all cases, we use a shareholder value function v, and we suppose that an agent (the firm
in our case) has already an available cash flow k. In order to emphasize the links with the
utility theory of von Neumann and Morgenstern we introduce the function:
uk(x) := v(k + x)− v(k).
(1) Indifference price:
ρk(X) := inf{m | E[uk(X +m)] ≥ 0}.
This is a generalization of the classical approach of shortfall risk measures seen as the
distance to some convex acceptable set of random variables. Indeed, we can define the
following acceptance set Ak := {x ∈ X | E(ℓk(−X)] ≤ 0}, with ℓk(x) = −uk(−x).
Then ρk(X) = inf{m | X +m ∈ Ak} as in [3], but here Ak is not convex when v is
not concave.
Also, let us note that, on the level sets where v is strictly increasing and concave,
ρ can be seen as the indifference price from the expected utility theory, since it is the
unique solution m of the equation: E[uk(m + X)] = uk(0) = 0. But ρ can also be
(and is commonly) interpreted as a capital requirement.
(2) Certainty equivalent:
CEk(X) := − inf{m|E[uk(X)] ≤ uk(m)}.
This measure corresponds to the concept of the certainty equivalent for X, i.e., the
sure amount for which an agent remains indifferent to a lottery X. Indeed, if we
suppose again that v is concave so that uk(x) = v(k + x) − v(k) can be interpreted
as a utility function in a classical sense, then CEk(x) = u
−1
k E[uk(X)], where u
−1
k is
the left-continuous inverse of uk.
We put forward a new class of risk measures:
(3) Impact price, or shareholder risk measure:
SRMk(X) := v(k)− E[v(k +X)] = −E[uk(X)]
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This is a measure of the loss in shareholder value that a random cash flow produces,
supposing shareholder value function is v. We shall endogenize the function v for the
shareholder value maximization. Note that SRM is conceptually different from the
measures presented above in (1) and (2). It is related to the utility theory of von
Neumann and Morgenstern with the following notable difference that the ”utility”
function we use:
(a) is not a concave function;
(b) depends on the current cash level in the firm. This means that as the cash level
of the firm evolves, the ”utility” function changes. Since the cash evolution is
random, the utility function that will apply at a future date is a random variable;
(c) can be extended to a dynamic set-up.
(d) represents a price, i.e., can be expressed in monetary units;
We can already remark that the fact that the cash invariance property fails, is a conse-
quence of the fact that SRM is not defined as a distance to some acceptable set, as is the
case of the coherent (and convex) risk measures, the financial interpretation being that cash
has sometimes more value inside the company than in the shareholder’s pocket (or sometimes
the opposite). The nonconvexity of SRM is linked to the nonconcavity of the function v. As
the set of acceptable risks Ak := {X | SRM(X) ≤ 0} is not convex, a risk measure in the
spirit of [3] is also non convex. At fixed level of the cash k in the firm, we shall nevertheless
identify some classes of risks for which SRM is convex or translation invariant (within a
given range of the cash being added/subtracted).
It can seem at a first sight surprising to have risk measures that may penalize diversifi-
cation. Quasi-concavity of risk measures seems to be a very natural feature, and SRM do
not satisfy this property in general. Let us emphasize again that here we do not take the
point of view of regulators, nor of a manager of some given portfolio in a company. From the
shareholders’ perspective, it is not always preferable to diversify risks involving both some
positive payments and, as a downside, the default of the company. If we exclude these risks,
we obtain what we shall call the class of sustainable risks, i.e., all random payments that do
not produce the default of the company. SRM is convex for the sustainable risks.
Finally, let us point out that it is of course possible to construct a robust version of the




this being perfectly compatible with the model we describe below (including in the dynamic
version of SRM).
3. Shareholder value maximization
This section presents the problem of optimal cash management of a firm optimizing the
flow of dividends payed to the shareholders. Our aim is to emphasize some properties of the
value function. We suppose that in absence of dividend payments, the available cash reserve
of a firm follows, as time goes on, a jump diffusion. At any time, as long as the cash reserve
remains positive, the firm can decide to pay a part of the available cash as dividends. The
objective is to determine the dividend scheme that maximizes the expected discounted flow
of dividends until the bankruptcy time (which is the first time when the cash process is less
than zero).
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The mathematical formulation is as follows. We suppose that (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P) is a filtered
probability space and (Wt) a standard Brownian motion. Let Ñ be an (Ft) compensated
Poisson random measure,
Ñ(t, A) = N(t, A)− E[N(t, A)] = N(t, A)− ν(A)t
where for every Borel set A, N(t, A) is a Poisson random measure measuring the number of
jumps with amplitude in A, up to and including time t and ν is the Lévy measure associated
with N . Here, ν is assumed finite and admiting a monotone density on R−.
Starting from an initial state k ∈ R for the cash level and given a dividend policy (ξt) (i.e.,
our control process), the dynamics of the cash reserve process of the firm is governed by:
dCt = b(Ct)dt+ σdWt +
∫
R
zÑ(dt, dz)− dξt, (3.1)
C0− = k (3.2)
with b(x) = µ + rx. The function b corresponds to the sum of expected earnings and
interests paid on the cash reserves (Ct). The process (ξt) is an adapted increasing process,
right-continuous, with ξ0− = 0, representing the cumulated dividend payments until time t
(our control process). Hence, the dynamics of the process in (3.1) represents the economically
meaningful evolution of cash reserves.
As it is common in the theory of Markov processes, we introduce a family of probability
measures (Px)x∈R, corresponding to a translation of (Ct) such that C0− = x under P
x and
thus allow for having arbitrary initial conditions. We write Pk = P. We denote Ex for the
expectation operator under the measure Px.
Let:
τ = inf{t ≥ 0 | Ct < 0}
be the time of bankruptcy of the firm. Obviously (Ct) and τ depend on the chosen dividend
policy (ξt). We use the simple notations that do not make explicit this dependence and






, ρ > 0 constant.
be the expected total discounted amount of dividends payed to the shareholders up to the






. The discount rate ρ is constant.
We assume that the probability measure P is the risk-adjusted probability measure. Thus,
shareholders are supposed to be able to diversify their portfolios. Our model corresponds to
a large company with diffuse ownership. It does not apply to a small company that would be
owned and managed by the same agent. In that case, the risk aversion of this owner-manager
would appear in the maximization problem. For such an analysis, look for example at Bank
an Riedel [7].
We define the set of admissible controls A as the set of adapted, nondecreasing, càdlàg
processes ξ such that a unique strong solution (Ct) of (3.1) exists, and such that for any
stopping times S ≤ T we have:
∫ T
S
Csdξs ≥ 0. This last condition ensures that no dividends
are payed that would exceed the cash reserve available.
5




































































We assume that the objective of the firm is to implement such a dividend policy ξ∗ that






In the remaining of this section we aim to emphasize some properties of the function v
which are useful later on, in particular the fact that it is not a concave function on R but it
is concave on R+.
Let us introduce the characteristic operator LC defined on a function F : R → R as
follows:
LCF (x) = lim
U↓x
ExF (CTU )− F (x)
ExTU
where the limit is taken over a family of open sets U shrinking down to x in R and TU =
inf{t ≥ 0 | Ct ∈ U c}. From the general theory of Markov processes we know that the
characteristic operator LC that corresponds the jump diffusion appearing in (3.1) when no




















Also, it will be useful to recall the following definition for the local time appearing in the
solution of the Skorohod problem for jump diffusions:
Definition 3.1. Let O ⊂ R be an open set. The Skorohod problem for the reflected jump
diffusion C into Ō is to find a pair (Ct, ξt) of càdlàg adapted processes such that the following
conditions are satisfied:
dCt = b(Ct)dt+ σdWt +
∫
R
zÑ(dt, dz)− dξt, (3.4)
Ct ∈ Ō, ∀t ≥ 0, (3.5)
(ξt) has finite variation and dξt = 0 if Ct ∈ O. (3.6)
The process ξ is called the local time at the boundary ∂O of the reflected process C.
3.1. A characterization of the optimal dividend strategy. The theorem below states
some properties of the value function when it is sufficiently smooths and of the corresponding





(A2) ρ > r.
(A3) σ 6= 0.
The case σ = 0 is treated in Albrecher and Thonhauser [2]. Conditions (A1)-(A3) all play
an important role in establishing the next result; additionally, the first two conditions can
be interpreted as some profitability conditions for the firm.
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Theorem 3.2. Suppose that there exists a function φ ∈ C2((0,∞))∩C(R) such that φ solves








= 0, ∀x ∈ (0,∞) (3.7)
φ(x) = 0, ∀x ≤ 0, (3.8)
with the set {x ∈ (0,∞) | LCφ(x)− ρφ(x) < 0} being non empty.
Then:
(i) There exists a constant x∗ ≥ 0 such that:
O :=
{






(the non intervention set).
(ii) φ is concave on the interval [0,∞).
(iii)
v(x) = φ(x).
(iv) The optimal control ξ∗ is the local time at x∗ of the jump diffusion C reflected back
into (0, x∗].
Proof. In this proof, we se shall always use the notation φ′(0) for the right-hand derivative
at zero.
Let us introduce the following set:
D : =
{
x ∈ (0,∞) | ∂φ
∂x
(x) = 1 and LCφ(x)− ρφ(x) ≤ 0
}
O and D are disjoint sets. Moreover, by definition of φ we have O ∪ D = (0,∞). O is
open and the interior of D is not empty (since the set {x ∈ (0,∞) | LCφ(x)− ρφ(x) < 0} is
supposed non empty).
Let us prove (i). If µ = b(0) ≤ 0 then φ(x) = x ∨ 0 is a solution of (3.7), (3.8) and
D = (0,∞), hence in this case (i) and (ii) hold.
If µ > 0, one can check that 0 /∈ D̄. We remark that whenever x belongs to the interior of
D then [x,∞) ⊆ D. Indeed, in D, LCφ(x)− ρφ(x) = b(x)− ρ(x+K) := h(x) with K some
constant such that h(x) ≤ 0. The function h is strictly decreasing since b′(x) < ρ for every x,
hence the statement. In order to show that D = [x∗,∞), for some x∗ > 0, it remains to show
that D does not have isolated points, other configurations for D being already excluded by
the above remark. For this, it is sufficient to show that φ′ is monotonic, D being precisely
the set where φ′ attains its minimum. Below we show that φ is concave, hence φ′ monotonic.
We now prove (ii), that is, φ is concave. We treat the case µ > 0 (we have shown that
when µ ≤ 0 then φ is linear, hence concave).
















ν(dz) := g(x). (3.9)
The function g satisfies g(0) < 0 (due to our assumption (A1)), hence φ concave in O near
0. In other words, φ′ satisfies φ′(0) > φ′(x∗) = 1 and is φ′ is decreasing near 0.
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Suppose that φ′ is not monotonic. Then there must be at least a local minimum of φ′ inside
(0, x∗), at a point say xm and a local maximum at a point say x
m with 0 < xm < x
m < x∗.
Without loss of generality, we assume that xm is the first local minimum of φ
′, i.e., φ′ is
decreasing on the interval (0, xm]. Furthermore, and also without loss of generality, we
suppose φ′(xm) is the maximum value of φ′ that also satisfies φ′′ = 0 (i.e., φ′(xm) is a global
maximum for φ′ inside the interval (xm, x
∗)). Our aim in what follows is to show φ′ cannot
have a local maximum at xm, which is a necessary and sufficient condition for proving the
monotonicity of φ′ hence the concavity of φ.
The sign of φ′′ is given by the sign of the function g in (3.9), since by the assumption (A3),
σ 6= 0. Hence, we need to have:
g′(xm) < 0 (3.10)
and:
g′(x) > 0 for x ∈ {xm, x∗}. (3.11)
Using (A2) and the properties: φ′′(xm) = φ
′′(xm) = φ′′(x∗) = 0 and φ(0) = 0, we get:
g′(x) = (ρ− r)φ′(x) +
∫
(φ′(x)− φ′(x+ z)) ν(dz) for x ∈ {xm, xm, x∗}.
Since ρ > r, we see that the maximum of φ′ needs to be attained at the boundary, i.e., at
x = 0 and xm can only be a local maximum of φ′ (otherwise (3.10) cannot be fulfilled).
The required inequalities (3.10) and (3.11) have in fact implications on the measure ν.
For instance, (3.10) cannot hold if the support of ν is contained in R+. Let us investigate
these inequalities in more detail. Suppose that ν admits a nondecreasing density on R−.
Substracting (3.11) from (3.10) with x = xm, we obtain:
(ρ− r)(φ′(xm)−φ′(xm)) <
∫




(φ′(xm + z)− φ′(xm))− (φ′(xm + z)− φ′(xm))ν(dz) < 0.
But this is a contradiction, since obviously we must have (ρ − r)(φ′(xm) − φ′(xm)) > 0
(both ρ > r and φ′(xm) > φ′(xm) must hold). If ν admits an nonincreasing density on R−
we substract again (3.11) from (3.10) but this time with x∗ instead of xm and we obtain
identical inequalities as above and same contradiction.
This proves that a local maximum for φ′ inside (0, x∗) cannot exist, i.e. φ′′ cannot switch
the sign from being positive to being negative in (0, x∗). Hence, φ′(x) is monotonically
decreasing on [0, x∗), i.e., φ is concave on [0, x∗).
(ii) is a consequence of the fact that φ is C2 concave on (0, x∗) and linear on (x∗,∞).
The proof of (iii) is classical. Suppose that x > 0. Choose any dividend policy ξ ∈ A and
t in the stochastic interval [0, τ ]. By Itô’s formula for the semimartingale C (recall that φ is




























































































where (tn) are the jumping times of ξ and ∆ξφ(Ctn) = φ(Ctn) − φ(Ctn + ∆ξtn)) is the
variation of φ due to the jump ∆ξtn = ξtn − ξtn−. Since φ is increasing and ξ increasing, all
∆ξφ(Ctn) ≤ 0.
Therefore, using (3.7):












(Cs)dWs, t ≥ 0 is a local martingale. We take a localizing
sequence (Ta)a≥1 of this local martingale. We then define the increasing sequence of stopping
times τa := Ta ∧ τ, a ≥ 1. Since the sequence (mτa) is uniformly integrable, it follows from
the above inequalities that also the sequence (e−ρτaφ(Cτa)) is uniformly integrable.
Taking expected value in (3.12) with t = τa, we obtain:



















From the inequations (3.7) we have that LCφ(x)− ρφ(x) ≤ 0. It follows that:



















for some point xn on the straight line between Ctn − ∆ξtn and Ctn . Using the inequality
∂φ
∂x
≥ 1, we obtain:






Letting a → ∞, since (φ(Cτa)) is uniformly integrable, lima→∞ τa = τ and φ(Cτ ) = 0 a.s.,
we obtain that:
φ(x) ≥ Jξ(x).
As this holds for any admissible control ξ, and since for x ≤ 0 we have by definition φ(x) =
v(x) = 0, we conclude that:
φ(x) ≥ v(x), ∀x ∈ R. (3.13)
In particular, since it is admissible to pay immediately time 0 dividends in amount C0,
v(x) ≥ x and hence we must also have:
φ(x) ≥ x.
Now suppose that ξt = L
y
t , the local time at y > 0 of the process C reflected back into
(0, y], for some y ≥ 0. Note that Ly ∈ A. Indeed, Ly is adapted, increasing, and càdlàg.
Moreover, a unique strong solution of (3.1) when ξt = L
y
t exists (see [10]).







solves the problem (3.7)-(3.8) for every x ∈ R. Combined with the inequality (3.13) this will
prove that Lx
∗
is the optimal strategy and φ = v.
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. Given x ∈ (0, y),
choose ǫ such that (x − ǫ, x + ǫ) ∈ (0, y) and denote Tǫ := inf{t ≥ 0 | Ct ∈ (x − ǫ, x + ǫ)c}.














We have used the fact that Tǫ ≤ τ a.s. and
∫ Tǫ
0





















This shows that LCg
y(x)− ρgy(x) = 0 for x ∈ (0, y). Also, by definition of Ly we have that
gy(y + c) = gy(y) + c,∀c > 0. Therefore, for any x ∈ (y,∞) gy(x) is linear (hence C2) and it
can be checked that both ∂g
y
∂x
(x) = 1 and LCg
y(x)− ρgy(x) < 0 hold.
Let us notice that gy(x) = 0 for x ≤ 0, that is equation (3.8) is verified by gy.
In order to prove points (iii) and (iv) of the theorem it is now sufficient to show that ∃ x∗
in [0,∞) such that gx∗ is C2((0,∞)). But this fact is ensured by the fact that a C2 solution
to (3.7) is assumed to exist plus the previous remark that the set O must be of the form
(0, x∗). 
The next Corollary emphasizes the fact that the function v is a shareholder value function
(see Definition 2.1) and therefore the corresponding risk measures will not be convex. As we
have shown, v is concave on (0,∞), the concavity breaks down on [−∞,∞] as a consequence
of the existence of the limited liability for shareholders.
Corollary 3.3. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.2, the value function v(x) is a share-
holder value function. It is constant on R− and concave on R+.
3.2. Some bibliographical comments and particular examples. There exists an ex-
tensive literature on barrier strategies for dividends, i.e., dividend payouts that are the local
time of the cash process at an upper level. Let us mention that the book by Schmidli [27],
treats among other topics the problem of dividend distributions in insurance companies and
the reader can find an overview of the topic.
These models were initially developed by actuaries, where the cash process was considered
to be the surplus of an insurance company. Dividends distributions of barrier type have
been shown to be optimal for some types of cash processes. The first model of this type
was elaborated by de Finetti [11]; he showed that if the risk/surplus process evolves as a
random walk with step sizes ±1, then an optimal way of paying out dividends is according to
a barrier strategy. In the case of continuous-time models, the problem of finding the optimal
dividend strategy has been studied extensively in the Cramér–Lundberg setting (Gerber [17];
Azcue and Muler [6]) and in the diffusion setting (Jeanblanc and Shiryaev [19]; Asmussen
and Taksar [4]; Gerber and Shiu [18]). It was recently generalized to the spectrally negative
Lévy model by Avram et al. [5], Kyprianou and Palmowski [20] and Loeffen [23], where the
surplus is a general Lévy process with only negative jumps.
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In the Cramér–Lundberg setting, the cash process is described by a Lévy process without
the Brownian part (this would correspond to our model with r = σ = 0). Our condition
(A3) was important in our proof of the Theorem 3.2 and it makes that our model does not
fit the Cramér–Lundberg setting. Notice that Gerber [17] has shown that not only barrier
but also band strategies can be optimal in the Cramér–Lundberg setting. A band strategy
is such that the cash process is reflected at an upper barrier and absorbed to zero by paying
a dividend once it crosses a lower barrier. This strategy can be optimal for some spectrally
negative Lévy cash process (see also Azcue and Muler [6]) and for some models falling in the
class studied in Abrecher and Thonhauser [2] (here again not containing a Brownian part).
We should emphasize that in the case of band strategies, the value function v(x) is non
concave even on R+, and also non smooth (in the sense that the first derivative is discontin-
uous). Concrete examples can be found for instance in Azcue and Muler [6] and Abrecher
and Thonhauser [2]. In this case the value function remains however a shareholder value
function (in the sense of our Definition 2.1) and a supremum of concave functions.
In the case of our model, the brownian component makes that paying out the cash entirely
as a dividend triggers the default of the firm. Hence, we have the boundary condition
v(0) = 0. This property excludes to have band strategies, as optimal strategies, even in the
situations where the value function would not be smooth (i.e., C2(0,∞)).
Below we give some examples of cash processes and the associated value functions.
3.2.1. Brownian Motion. This model is presented in Jeanblanc-Picqué and Shiryaev [19] and
Shreve, Lehoczky and Gaver [28]. Suppose b(x) ≡ µ > 0 and N(t, A) ≡ 0 for any Borel set





0 ≤ x ≤ x∗







and r1 > 0 > r2 are the roots of the equation: σ
2r2 + 2µr − 2ρ = 0.
v(x) = v(x∗) + x− x∗ for x > x∗.
3.2.2. Linear drift. Suppose that b(x) = µ+ rx and N(t, A) ≡ 0 for any Borel set A.
We obtain that v is solution of:
σ2
2
v′′(x) + (µ+ rx)v′(x)− ρv(x) = 0 (3.14)
v(0) = 0 (3.15)
v′(x∗) = 1 (3.16)

















f ′ − λf = 0, (3.17)
with λ := (r − ρσ2/2)/2r.
We denote by F (a, b, x) the standard confluent hypergeometric function (or Kummer’s
function) which arises as a solution of confluent hypergeometric differential equation xy′′ +
(b− x) y′ − ay = 0. The solution of the equation (3.17) is:
f(y) = C1f1(y) + C2f2(y),
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Figure 1. Value function v(x) when the cash process X is a Brownian Motion.
where C1 et C2 are constants and f1 and f2 are two independent solutions:
f1(y) = F (λ, 1/2, y)
f2(y) = y





































(with the constants C1 and C2 fully determined by the boundary conditions).
3.2.3. Negative, exponentially distributed jumps. The case with r = 0, ν(dz) = 1z<0λδe
−δzdz
is studied in Belhaj [8] (see page 319 for the optimal value function and the barrier level in
this model).
4. Properties of shareholder risk measures
We want to establish some properties of the shareholder risk measure (SRM) generated
by the shareholder value function v that is the solution of the optimization problem from
the previous section, or more generally using a shareholder value function that is concave
on (0,∞) and is linear and on (x∗,∞) with x∗ ≥ 0 (one can have in mind Figure 1).
The objective is too see how different the SRM is as compared to the classical convex risk
measures.
We recall that a convex risk measure ρ : X → R is defined by the following properties:
(1) Monotonicity: If X ≤ Y , then ρ(X) ≥ ρ(Y ).
12




































































(2) Translation invariance (or cash invariance): If m ∈ R, then ρ(Y +m) = ρ(Y )−m.
(3) Convexity: For any λ ∈ (0, 1), ρ(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ λρ(X)− (1− λ)ρ(Y ).
4.1. Shareholder risk measures: a definition and some properties. Assume that we
are time zero and an amount k ∈ [0, x∗] of cash is available in the firm. Then, as described
in the previous section, the shareholders value their shares as v(k). If a random cash flow
X is about to affect the cash available in the firm, then the shareholders measure the risk of
this random cash flow by its impact on their shareholder value.
We therefore define the following:
Definition 4.1. (1) We denote by X the class of random variables X on (Ω,F) such
that E[v(k+X)] <∞. The (instantaneous) shareholder risk measure for any X ∈ X
is defined as:
SRM(X) := v(k)− E[v(k +X)].
(2) We denote Xk := {X ∈ X | X > −k} i.e., the set of risks bounded below by −k. Xk
is called the set of sustainable risks. Each risk in this class does not trigger the firm’s
default, since the firm has sufficient cash to absorb its possible losses.
(3) The set of random variablesX satisfyingE[v(k+X)] ≥ v(k) or equivalently SRM(X) ≤
0 is called the set of acceptable risks.
The intuition behind the definitions above is simple. If the cash process of the firm is
impacted by a random variable X, then the value of the cash process changes from k to
k + X and the value function from v(k) to v(k + X). The SRM evaluates the impact
on the value function just before the random shock arrives, i.e., when there is no time to
adjust the dividend policy before the occurrence of the shock. If the risk X is such that
E[v(k+X)] < v(k) it would be more convenient for shareholders to refuse being exposed to
the risk X. We say that such risks are not acceptable. Note that concept of acceptability
here is different in its interpretation from the one introduced in Delbaen and al. [3], where
a risk is not acceptable when it requires additional capital. In our setting, shareholders take
only the decision of the dividend policy and we do not allow for new capital injections.
Notation 4.2. With any random variable X ∈ X we attach a random variable Xk ∈ Xk by:
Xk := X1{X>−k} − k1{X≤−k} = max{X,−k}.
Proposition 4.3 (Basic properties of the shareholder risk measure). SRM satisfies the
following properties:
(i) SRM(0) = 0. More generally, if X is such that Xk = 0 a.s., then SRM(X) = 0.
(ii) General upper bound: SRM(X) ≤ v(k).
(iii) Monotonicity: if X and Y are such that Xk > Yk a.s. then SRM(X) < SRM(Y ).
(iv) For X ≥ x∗ − k and m ≥ x∗ − (k +X) SRM has the property of cash invariance:
SRM(X +m) = SRM(X)−m.
(v) Internality (partial): if X and Y are such that Xk ≥ Yk a.s., then for λ ∈ (0, 1),
min{SRM(X), SRM(Y )} ≤ SRM(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ max{SRM(X), SRM(Y )}.
(vi) Law equivariance: if X and Y are such that Xk and Yk have the same distribution,
then SRM(X) = SRM(Y ).
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Proof. (iii) Since Xk > Yk a.s. and v is strictly increasing on [0,∞), we have that v(k +
X) = v(k+Xk) > v(k+ Yk) = v(k+ Y ) and the result follows from the definition of
SRM.
(iv) consequence of the fact that v(x) is linear for x > x∗.
(v) We suppose thatX and Y are such thatXk ≥ Yk a.s.. In this case v(k+X) ≥ v(k+Y )
a.s. and therefore:
E[v(k + λX + (1− λ)Y )] ≥ E[min(v(k +X), v(k + Y ))]
= E[v(k + Y ))] = min{E[v(k +X)],E[v(k + Y )]}
and:
E[v(k + λX + (1− λ)Y )] ≤ E[max(v(k +X), v(k + Y ))]
= E[v(k +X))] = max{E[v(k +X)],E[v(k + Y )]}.

We now write an equivalent form for the acceptable SRM , which emphasizes some simi-
larities and differences with a class of law-equivariant or law-determined risk measures (also
known as law-invariant risk measures). Kusuoka [22] has shown that every law equivariant,
comonotonically additive risk measure can be represented as the expectation of the risk under
a convexly distorted distribution. Namely, there exists a distortion D (i.e., D : [0, 1] → [0, 1]








where FX(x) := P(X ≤ x).
Notation 4.4. On the interval [0, x∗], the function v is strictly concave therefore v′ is in-
vertible. We denote by (v′)−1 the inverse of v′. By the mean value theorem, we have that for
x > −k, there exists a point y between k and x+ k such that v(k+x)− v(k) = xv′(y). Since
we have k ∈ (0, x∗), the point y also satisfies y ∈ (0, x∗). Therefore, we define the function:
gk(x) =:
{






if x ∈ R∗
We also introduce the notations:
FX(x) : = P(X ≤ x)
FXk(x) : = P(Xk ≤ x)






(i) If X > 0 a.s., we have that
∫
R
xv′ (gk(x)) dFXk(x) ≥ E(Xk) = E[X] hence:
SRM(X) ≤ −E(X)
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(ii) If X < 0 a.s., we have that
∫
R
xv′ (gk(x)) dFXk(x) ≤ E[Xk] hence:
SRM(X) ≥ −E(Xk)
Let us comment on the above representations of ρ versus SRM . Any law invariant com-
monotone risk measure for X can be written as an expected value of −X under a new
probability measure. This probability measure is obtained by distorting the law of X using
a given function D (thus for risks having different laws we get different probabilities after
distortion). When computing the SRM for X, we also compute the expectation of −X,
but under a measure which is not a probability measure anymore. More precisely, because
v′(x) ≥ 1 on R+ we have that the new measure has a total mass which exceeds 1. The new
measure depends not only on the law of X (in fact on the law of Xk), but also on the level
of cash in the firm k. The higher the cash level, the lower the total mass of our measure
change.
4.2. Further properties of SRM: the case of bounded risks.
Proposition 4.6 (Convexity for sustainable risks). Let X ∈ Xk and Y ∈ Xk. Then, for any
λ ∈ [0, 1] we have:
SRM(λX + (1− λ)Y ) ≤ λSRM(X) + (1− λ)SRM(Y ).
The same holds, if, more generally, {X < −k} = {Y < −k} (thus X and Y needn’t be
sustainable).
Proof. Xk is convex and v is concave on R+. Hence for X ∈ Xk and Y ∈ Xk:
SRM(λX + (1− λ)Y ) = v(k)− E [v (λ(k +X) + (1− λ)(k + Y ))]
≤ v(k)− E [λv(k +X) + (1− λ)v(k + Y )]
= λSRM(X) + (1− λ)SRM(Y ).
The same holds if {X < −k} = {Y < −k}, because for all λ ∈ [0, 1] we have {X < −k} =
{λX + (1− λ)Y < −k} = {Y < −k}. 
Proposition 4.7 (Translation by a constant). Suppose that X ∈ [xmin, xmax] for xmax, xmin
constants and we take m constant.
(1) For moderate values of m, namely: if −v(k + xmin) ≤ m < 0 or 0 < m ≤ v−1(m)−
(k + xmax), then:
SRM(X +m) ≥ SRM(X)−m
(2) For extreme values of m, namely: if m < −v(k + xmax) or m > max(v−1(m)− (k +
xmin); 0), then:
SRM(X +m) ≤ SRM(X)−m
Proof. Let us suppose that m < 0.
If k + X + m ≥ 0, then necessarily k + X > 0 and v(k + X) − v(k + X + m) ≥ −m
(because v′(x) ≥ 1 for x ∈ R+ and we can use the mean value theorem). It follows that
SRM(X +m) ≥ SRM(X)−m.
If k + X + m < 0, and k + X ≤ 0 then v(k + X) = v(k + X + m) = 0 and hence,
v(k+X)−v(k+X+m) = 0 < −m. It follows in this case that SRM(X+m) < SRM(X)−m.
If k+X+m < 0, and k+X ∈ [0, v−1(−m)] then v(k+X)−v(k+X+m) = v(k+X) < −m,
therefore SRM(X +m) < SRM(X)−m.
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If k+X+m < 0, and k+X ∈ [v−1(−m),−m] then v(k+X)−v(k+X+m) = v(k+X) >
−m, therefore SRM(X +m) > SRM(X)−m.
Summarizing the above we get: If m < 0 constant, then:
• If X ≥ v−1(−m)− k, then SRM(X +m) ≥ SRM(X)−m;
• If X ≤ v−1(−m)− k, then SRM(X +m) ≤ SRM(X)−m.
We now suppose that m > 0.
If v(k + X + m) ≤ m, then necessarily k + X < 0 and v(k + X) − v(k + X + m) =
−v(k +X +m) ≥ −m. It follows that SRM(X +m) ≥ SRM(X)−m.
If v(k+X+m) > m, and k+X ≤ 0 then v(k+X)−v(k+X+m) = −v(k+X+m) < −m.
It follows in this case that SRM(X +m) < SRM(X)−m.
If v(k +X +m) > m, and k +X > 0 then we also have v(k +X)− v(k +X +m) < −m
(since v′(x) ≥ 1 for x ∈ R+ and we can use the mean value theorem) hence SRM(X +m) <
SRM(X)−m.
Summarizing for m > 0, we get:
• If X ≥ v−1(m)−m− k, then SRM(X +m) ≤ SRM(X)−m;
• If X ≤ v−1(m)−m− k, then SRM(X +m) ≥ SRM(X)−m.
Combining the results for m > 0 and m < 0 we get the result stated in the proposition. 
One can notice that the following result was proved inside the proof of Proposition 4.7
(where in a first step we were not using upper and lower bounds for X):
Corollary 4.8. Suppose that X∈Xk and m constant such that X + m ∈ Xk. Then, the
following hold:
(1) If m < 0 then SRM(X +m) ≥ SRM(X)−m;
(2) If m > 0 then SRM(X +m) ≤ SRM(X)−m.
The corollary above emphasizes that SRM fails to be cash invariant even when restricted
to the case of sustainable risks.
For convex risk measures, the property of cash invariance is also questionable, for instance
in the context of uncertainty about the interest rates. El Karoui and Ravanelli [13] propose
to replace it with a relaxed version, called cash subadditivity (see also Cerreia-Vioglio et
al. [9]). In the context of capital requirements, the meaning of cash subadditivity is that,
when m dollars are subtracted from a future position, the present capital requirement cannot
be increased by more that m dollars. We should mention that there is a temporal aspect
embedded in this reasoning (namely that the risk is to be materialized at a future date), so
that not directly comparable to our framework, as we treat instantaneous risks. However,
we can see here again that what is desirable from regulators’ perspective, does not naturally
fit the shareholder’s preferences. From the viewpoint of SRM, when a position is decreased
by m dollars, the risk increases by more that m dollars, we have thus cash superadditivity.
Intuitively, cash has more value when kept inside the company (except in the region where
dividend distributions occur, as characterized in Proposition 4.3 (iv)).
The set Xk of sustainable risks has the convenient property of being a convex set. There-
fore, we can construct a convex risk measure for Xk as follows. Let us denote by
Sk := {X ∈ Xk | SRM(X) ≥ 0}
16




































































i.e., the set of sustainable and acceptable risks. This being also a convex set, we further
denote for all X ∈ Xk:
ρS(X) = inf{m ≥ −k | m+X ∈ Sk}. (4.1)
ρS is a convex risk measure (this can be checked using the Theorem 4.7 in [15]). The
following result shows that the coherent measure ρS is more conservative, in the sense that
it underestimates the non acceptable risks as compared with SRM.
Corollary 4.9. Let X ∈ Xk and ρS be as in (4.1). Then:
(1) If X ∈ Sk then SRM(X) ≤ ρS(X).
(2) If X /∈ Sk then SRM(X) ≥ ρS(X).
Proof. Notice first that ρS is the unique solution for:
E[v(k +X +m)] = v(k). (4.2)
That ρS solves (4.2) follows by dominated convergence, since the function v is continuous
and the solution is unique since v is strictly increasing (indeed, since X ∈ Xk we need to
consider the properties of the function v on R+ only).
As a consequence:
SRM(X + ρS(X)) = 0.
Consider that X ∈ Sk. Then ρS(X) ≤ 0. Therefore, from Corollary 4.8, we obtain that:
0 = SRM(X + ρS(X)) ≥ SRM(X)− ρS(X).
On the other hand, if X ∈ Sk then ρS(X) ≥ 0. Therefore, again from Corollary 4.8, we
obtain that:
0 = SRM(X + ρS(X)) ≤ SRM(X)− ρS(X).

4.3. Risk magnification. Another property that has been mentioned in the literature as
a desirable property for risk measures is the so-called star shapedness (or more precisely,
0-star shapedness): when a risk is magnified by a factor greater that 1, the risk measure
increases more than proportionally (see Cerreia-Vioglio and al. [9]). This is a weakening of
the property of positive homogeneity, as follows:
ρ(λX) ≥ λρ(X) for λ ∈ [1,∞).
Let us note that when the reverse inequality holds, the function is called ∞-star shaped.
We now analyze the behavior of SRM in case of risk magnification. Since our risk measures
depend also on the cash level, the scaling of the risk X needs to take place in the same time as
a scaling of the level of the cash k, if one wants to ensure correct comparison. In other words,
we need to think of SRM as a two dimensional function. Therefore, we denote SRM(X|k)
the risk measure for X conditional to the cash level being k.
Proposition 4.10. (1) If X ≥ 0 then
SRM(λX|λk) ≥ λSRM(X|k) for λ ∈ [1,∞),
that is, when restricted to positive risks, SRM is 0-star shaped.
(2) If X ≤ 0 then
SRM(λX|λk) ≤ λSRM(X|k) for λ ∈ [1,∞),
that is, when restricted to negative risks, SRM is ∞-star shaped.
17




































































Proof. We take λ ∈ [1,∞) and denote ψ(x) := v(λx) − λv(x). For x ≤ 0 we have ψ(x) =
0; for x > 0: ψ′(x) = λ(v′(λx) − v′(x)) ≤ 0, i.e., ψ is a negative, decreasing function
(hence the function v is ∞-star shaped). This ensure the stated properties of SRM, since:
SRM(λX|λk) = λSRM(X|k)− E[ψ(k +X)− ψ(k)]. 
Here the financial interpretation is also clear: consolidation leads to more acceptance of
the negative shocks. On the contrary, in absence of negative shocks, distinct, smaller entities
are to be preferred.
5. Risk measures associated with cash flows arriving at a future date
Let us now assume that the random shock X will affect the cash flow process at a future
date T ≥ 0, the risk is hence characterized by the couple (T,X). We assume that the
shareholders can implement dividend strategies optimally, anticipating the random shock
(T,X). In this case, the value function will be different from the one characterized in
Section 3 and the definition of SRM should be extended to reflect the anticipation of shocks
that arrive in the future.
For simplicity, we only consider here the case where the risk (T,X) has the characteristics:
(1) T is a stopping time in the filtration (Ft) generated by the cash process (Ct).
(2) X is a random variable independent from F∞.
This framework covers some typical situations: cash flows arriving at a fixed date, or at
jumps of the Lévy process (the latter characterizes a situation where the perception on the
size of the shock suffers an adjustment but not the arrival rate). This framework could be
extended, but we want to keep the discussion simple.
We now define the cash process in presence of the random shock (T,X) and a dividend
process (ξt), as a stochastic process (C̃t) with dynamics:
dC̃t = dCt +Xd1{T≤t} for t ∈ [0,∞) (5.1)
C̃0− = k. (5.2)
The dependence in the chosen dividend strategy ξ is implicit via the process C.
We denote by (Gt) the natural augmented filtration of the process (C̃t). We have that
Gt = Ft ∨ σ(X1{T≤s}, s ≤ t) = Ft ∨ σ(X1{T≤t}) (the last equality holds because T is
considered a stopping time in the filtration (Ft)). In particular Ft = Gt for t < T . Let:
τ̃(t) := inf{s ≥ t | C̃s < 0}, t ≥ 0
i.e., τ̃(t) is the first time after time t when the cash process is negative, in presence of the
random shock (T,X). Similarily, we define for the process (Ct), i.e., in absence of the random
shock (T,X):
τ(t) := inf{s ≥ t | Cs < 0}, t ≥ 0.
For simplicity, we write τ̃ (respectively τ) for τ̃(0) (respectively τ(0)). The optimal dividend










with Ãt = Ã(t, C̃t), where Ã(t, x) is the set of admissible controls after time t, that is, the
set of (Gt)-adapted, nondecreasing, càdlàg processes ξ such that a unique strong solution
18








































































C̃sdξs ≥ 0. This last condition ensures that no dividends are payed that would
exceed the cash reserve available. We shall consider (Vt) to be right-continuous.
For defining the dynamic version of the SRM, we need to write more precisely the value
function before the random shock occurs. For this purpose, we introduce the two dimensional
process Z = (Z1, Z2), R+ × R-valued with components having the dynamics: dZ1s = ds,
dZ2s = dCZ10+s, s ≥ 0. We introduce a family of probability measures (P
(t,x))(t∈R+,x∈R) on
(R+ × R × Ω,B(R+ × R) ⊗ F) such that under P(t,x), the process Z starts at (t, x) (i.e.,
Z10 = t, Z
2
0 = x)). We denote hereafter E
(t,x) the expectation under P(t,x).
We also define:








By (slight) abuse of notation we have used above τ̃ = inf{s ≥ 0 | Z2s < 0}.
We now give an expression of the process V using the functions v and ṽ.
Proposition 5.1. The process V is given by:
Vt =
{
ṽ(t, Ct) if t < T ,
v(C̃t) if t ≥ T
Proof. Recall that for all t < T we have that C̃t = Ct and therefore Ft = Gt and Ãt =
Ã(t, Ct). Then:









since it corresponds precisely to the problem in (5.3).
Once the random shock occurs, the problem becomes time homogeneous. Consequently,
for t ≥ T we have: Ã(t, C̃t) = A(C̃t), i.e., given the current cash level the admissible

























Definition 5.2. We denote by X (T ) the class of random variables X on (Ω,F) such that
E[v(CT + X)] < ∞ and where T is an (Ft)-stopping time. For any X ∈ X (T ) and t ≤ T ,
we define the time t shareholder risk measure as the Ft-measurable random variable:
SRMt(X) := (v(Ct)− ṽ(t, Ct))1{τ>t}.
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The time t shareholder risk measure, conditional on the cash level being k ≥ 0 is denoted:
SRMt(X|k) := v(k)− ṽ(t, k).
The SRMt(X) represents the impact on the shareholder value of the exogenous shock
(T,X), including the optimal readjustment of the dividend strategy from time t on.
The next lemma is helpful in understanding the link between the instantaneous SRM and
the dynamic counterpart taken at time T .
Lemma 5.3.
ṽ(T,CT ) = E[v(CT +X)|GT−],
and:
ṽ(T, x) = E[v(x+X)].
Proof. We have by definition of the function ṽ that:




Since X is independent from the process (Ct), hence from FT , we have
ṽ(T, x) = E[v(x+X)].
To conclude, we need to show FT = GT−. Let us recall a less standard definition of GT−
which is:
GT− = σ{YT , (Yt) any (Gt)-adapted, left continuous process}
(this can be obtained similarly to Ex. 4.20 p. 47 in [29]). By construction of the filtration
(Gt), the class of (Ft) adapted left continuous processes stopped at T is the same as the
class of (Gt) adapted left continuous processes stopped at T , that is, GT− = FT−. Finally,
the filtration (Ft) is generated by the cash process (Ct) (which has no jumps at predictable
times) hence is quasi left continuous, i.e. FT− = FT for all stopping times T . 
With the help of Lemma 5.3, we can make the link between the above definition and the
instantaneous measure SRM(X) that was introduced in the previous section:
(1) Conditionally on the cash level. We have:
SRMT (X|k) = (v(k)− E[v(k +X)]) = SRM(X),
that is, at the maturity T , the shareholder’s risk measure coincide with the instan-
taneous risk measure corresponding to the same cash level.
(2) Unconditionally on the cash level. In general, the instantaneous risk measure for
(T,X) is an FT -measurable random variable that can be written:
SRMT (X) = v(CT )− E[v(CT +X)|GT−].
The process (SRMt(X), t ∈ [0, T ]) is an (Ft) adapted process since it is a function of the
cash process C and time. Also, it is absorbed at 0 at the bankruptcy time τ .
In order to further analyze the process (SRMt) it is necessary to specify the dynamics of
the process (Ct) in particular the implemented dividend strategy ξ. Let us now consider (Ct)
is the optimal cash process in absence of the random shock. In other words, we assume the
implemented dividend strategy is the local time at x∗, i.e., the optimal barrier as in Section
3. In this case, we obtain the following result:
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Theorem 5.4. The discounted process (e−ρtSRMt(X))t∈[0,T∧τ̃ ] is a submartingale.
Proof. Let us denote by (L̃∗t ) the local time at x
∗ of the process C̃ and by (L∗t ) is the
local time at x∗ of the process C. Let us consider the dividend strategy that consists in
paying a dividend process L̃∗. This being one possible choice among the admissible dividend
strategies in presence of the random shock (T,X), and not necessarily optimal, we obtain
that for t < T ∧ τ :




















= v(Ct) + E
[
1{τ≥T}e




We have used the fact that on [0, T ) C̃ ≡ C and C̃T = CT + X. Notice that even though
the random variables τ(t) and τ̃(t) differ, the two sets {τ̃(t) ≥ T} and {τ(t) ≥ T} are equal,
their complements being equal. Thus, we preferred to split the dividend flow in such a way
that we can use this property.











, which proves the statement. 
The theorem can be interpreted as follows: the discounted risk measure increases in average
when the time to the shock decreases. This is a consequence of the fact that when the time
to the shock decreases, the shareholders have less time to adjust their dividend strategy
before the random shock occurs, hence the impact on their value function will be higher.
Some additional inequalities can be easily derived from the Theorem 5.4 and Proposition
4.5, for risks that do not involve losses, that is X ≥ 0 a.s.. However, it is not possible to
establish simple and general relations when losses are involved (that is P(X < 0) > 0).




To conclude, we can remark under the assumed framework, the dynamic version of SRM
is not a time consistent risk measure in the way dynamic convex risk measures are (see for
instance [1]).
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ANSWER TO THE REVIEWER 1
We would like to thank the referee for a very careful reading and the many pertinent
comments that have improved our paper, now that we have incorporated all of them.
We detail below our answers to the major points raised:
(1) (Here we simultaneously address point (4), which is of similar nature.) Following
your suggestion we explain in more detail that, although the traditional approach
to risk measures is normative, we adopt here a positive viewpoint: how private
companies measure risks in the interest of their shareholders.
(2) Page 5, paragraph 5: we added this paragraph where we make more precise our
point of view. This important point was missing. Of course, other approaches are
possible, and could be considered in further research, as the ones you suggest. We
choose rather to set our model in the framework of complete markets.
(3) Thank you for raising this point. A paragraph was added (penultimate paragraph,
page 16).
(4) See (1).
(5) A subsection was added on star shapedness: 4.3., page 17, thank you for suggesting
to look to this property.
(6)-(7)-(8) Done as suggested.
We have also carefully incorporated all the comments which were classified by the re-
viewer as minor. Additionally, we would like to draw the attention on the fact that a
new paragraph on time consistency was added (last paragraph page 21) in response of a
question of reviewer 2.
Date: October 13, 2015.
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ANSWER TO THE REVIEWER 2
We would like to thank the referee for a very careful reading and the many pertinent
comments that have improved our paper, now that we have incorporated all of them. We
detail below our answers to the main points raised:
(1) It is common in the literature of singular control to consider the control process (the
dividend process ξ in our case) to be right continuous (see the book by Øksendal and
Sulem for instance). The decision should not foresee future shocks; this property
is insured by the fact that the control process is adapted. Choosing RC controls
implies that the decision is not necessarily predictable. This feature does not have
any unpleasant implications and has some advantages. Indeed, let us consider a
predictable control ξ. Then, the typical situation where this would play a different
role, is at jump times of the Lévy process. When ξ needs to be increased just after
such a jump, ξ will be left continuous. Consequently, the controlled cash reserves
will be neither left continuous nor right continuous at that jump. By replacing ξ by
ξ
−
as the control process, we preserve RC sample path for the cash process. And
the obtained cash process is indistinguishable from the first one. Therefore, one
can without harm of have RC dividend processes.
(2) In fact, the paper mentions one example with jumps, see subsection 3.2.3.
(3) We care about emphasizing the limited liability for shareholders and the property
v(x) = 0 on x ∈ (−∞, 0) is perfectly reflecting this feature. Changing it as you
suggests would lead to ”infinite punishment” in case of default. In fact limited
liability makes shareholders indifferent at default and they accept default as a
downside of some risky positions. Our point is that diversification is not working
in the usual way since shareholders are hedged in case of default. This feature
would not be captured in the framework you suggest.
(4) Thank you for pointing our the paper by Bank and Riedel, which appears now
in the bibliography. We decided to be more precise on our model specification
(see paragraph 5 on page 5). Introducing utility functions as you suggest is an
interesting topic that would require some deep investigation of the resulting value
function and related risk measures. Also, dividends are money, hence their value
is transferable in time for later consumption, hence we believe that our framework
is coherent (the situation would be different in a non financial framework with
consumption in the form of perishable goods for instance).
(5) The existence of a regular solution in the general case is not guaranteed, it depends
on the Lévy measure under consideration. For instance, in the case of spectrally
Date: October 13, 2015.
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2 SHAREHOLDER RISK MEASURES ANSWER TO THE REVIEWER 2
negative Lévy processes, some smoothness conditions of the q-scale function of the
Lévy process have been shown to be sufficient conditions (see Loeffen [1] for more
details).
We now answer the points raised by the reviewer in the section Remarks.
• This was justified in the point (3) above.
• The statement was removed.
• The assumptions are now to be found in front of Theorem 3.2 and we added two
words on the financial motivations (but clearly the conditions are important for
their mathematical implications).
• Yes, it was a typo, we corrected.
• Done.
• Done.
• This was justified in the point (3) above.
• This was justified in the point (3) above.
• Thank you, typos corrected.
• Yes, we agree that both assumptions are strong. We did not try the most general
framework, but we were willing to give an idea of how the dynamic case would
work. Assumption (1) can be replaced with the assumption that the arrival time is
independent from the filtration of the process C (the computations are feasible if we
assume some distribution for the arrival time T , as for instance exponential). Then,
together with assumption (2) it would characterize a situation of an independent
risks (both in the arrival and the amount). Treating this case would require some
additional projections on the filtration (Ft). This case is a bit more elaborate to
treat and does not cover some typical situations firms are facing: risks arriving at
a fixed maturity and risks that arrive at the jumps of the Lévy process (this is a
situation when the perception on the size of the shock suffers a change but not the
arrival rate).
• d stands for the derivative.
• Time consistency: SRM is not time consistent. A paragraph was added (last para-
graph page 21).
We would also like to draw the attention upon the introduction of a new subsection (4.3.
page 17) in response to a question of Reviewer 1. Also, the introduction was very slightly
rewritten.
References
[1] Loeffen, R. L.: On optimality of the barrier strategy in de Finetti’s dividend problem for spectral
negative Lévy processes, The Annals of Applied Probability, 18(5), 1669–1680 (2008).
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